

CLASSIFIED: THIS NEVER HAPPENED// REL DONT TELL MOM

---

HEADQUARTERS

---

STRATEGIC EXERCISE DIRECTIVE

TITLE: Comparative Analysis and Operational Effectiveness Assessment of U.S. Rifle Companies vs Soviet Rifle Companies - 1948

DATE: JANUARY 8, 1948

TO: ALL ASSIGNED PERSONNEL

FROM: LT. COL. J. J. BOYCE, STRATEGIC PLANNING DIVISION

I. OBJECTIVE:

To evaluate and compare the operational capabilities of U.S. and Soviet Rifle Companies within the context of 1948 through simulated wargaming scenarios in the Command and Conquer: Red Alert 1948 mod. The exercise aims to identify relative strengths, weaknesses, and recommended force adjustments to ensure combat superiority.

II. BACKGROUND:

Tensions along the Iron Curtain in 1948 necessitate a comprehensive analysis of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Both sides rely heavily on light infantry, light tank support, light artillery, and light close air support. This exercise will simulate engagements using OpenRA's 1948 mod to determine likely outcomes and highlight areas for strategic improvements.

III. SCOPE:

Participants will conduct a tactical assessment of U.S. Rifle Companies and Soviet Rifle Companies. Analysis will include:

- Unit Composition and Equipment
- Firepower and Mobility
- Defensive and Offensive Capabilities
- Support Assets Integration
- Engagement Outcomes and Tactical Adjustments

IV. SIMULATION PARAMETERS:

1. Forces and Unit Composition
  - a. U.S. Rifle Company
    - i. Platoons equipped with M1 Garand rifles, M1918 BARs, and M1 Mortars, M35 trucks, and light wheeled vehicles

CLASSIFIED: THIS NEVER HAPPENED// REL DONT TELL MOM

CLASSIFIED: THIS NEVER HAPPENED// REL DONT TELL MOM

- b. Two Soviet Rifle Companies
  - i. Platoons equipped with Mosin-Nagant rifles, DP-27 LMGs, and RM-38 Mortars
- 2. Engagement Terrain and Setup:
  - a. Urban, rural, and mixed environments to simulate diverse combat scenarios.
  - b. Force ratio adjustments.
  - c. Allied Defensive fortifications and limited cover.
- 3. Simulation Rules:
  - a. Two soviet companies.
  - b. Resource constraints and supply management enforced.
  - c. Fog of war enabled.

V. DELIVERABLES:

A. After-Action Reports (AAR):

- 1. Force Composition Effectiveness.
- 2. Tactical Maneuver Success Rates.
- 3. Casualty Rates and Resource Depletion.
- 4. Key Observations and Lessons Learned.

B. Recommendations for Force Adjustments:

- 1. Equipment Modernization Priorities.
  - a. Describe the most effective weapon systems against various adversaries.
- 2. Tactical Doctrine Enhancements.
  - a. Describe the most effective force deployments, formations, and maneuver tactics.
- 3. Unit Training Focus Areas.
  - a. Describe the greatest failures of troop coordination for commanders to focus on.

VI. EVALUATION METRICS:

- 1. Firepower: Rate of Fire, Range, and Ammunition Efficiency.
  - a. Compare effectiveness of respective weapons systems
    - i. Rifle vs rifle
    - ii. Machinegun vs machinegun
    - iii. Mortar vs mortar
- 2. Mobility: Speed, Maneuverability, and Terrain Adaptability.
  - a. Compare effectiveness of troops and vehicles
    - i. Personnel
    - ii. Vehicles
- 3. Durability: Armor, Fortifications, and Defensive Measures.
  - a. Compare resilience of units under fire from enemy

CLASSIFIED: THIS NEVER HAPPENED// REL DONT TELL MOM

CLASSIFIED: THIS NEVER HAPPENED// REL DONT TELL MOM

VIII. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION:

This document and all associated materials are classified as THIS NEVER HAPPENED // REL DONT TELL MOM. Unauthorized dissemination is prohibited.

AUTHORIZED BY:

LT. COL. J. J. BOYCE

STRATEGIC PLANNING DIVISION

CLASSIFIED: THIS NEVER HAPPENED// REL DONT TELL MOM