

BRIEFING TO MAJ. GEN. & STAFF

LT. COL. GRAVES:

Gentlemen, focus on the map. The Inchon Landing has fundamentally reshaped this war. This operation turned a desperate defensive stand at Pusan into an offensive maneuver with strategic depth. What we executed at Inchon must now be leveraged into continued advantage. I will outline how terrain, mobility, and superior firepower can accelerate this momentum and force a decisive collapse of enemy forces.

BACKGROUND

On **15 September 1950**, the **1st Marine Division**, supported by naval and air assets, executed an amphibious landing at Inchon. *Here.* (Gestures to Inchon on the map.) The operation defied conventional amphibious warfare doctrine. *We exploited the unexpected—narrow tidal windows, urban complexity, and enemy miscalculations.* The result: a complete rout of North Korean positions in Seoul. Within days, we severed enemy supply lines, forcing a retreat south.

ENEMY DISADVANTAGES

Now, let's look at what we faced. *Here.* (Points to North Korean positions.)

1. **No effective air power** – North Korean forces are limited in close air support, relying only on Soviet advisors and outdated assets.
2. **Rigid supply lines** – All major logistics routes flow *south through Seoul*. When we took Seoul, we cut their operational endurance in half.
3. **Limited naval or amphibious response** – They had no means to contest our landings at sea.
4. **Armor inefficiency** – Soviet **T-34s** cannot maneuver effectively in **urban or marshy terrain**.

U.S. & UN ADVANTAGES

Now, let's talk about what we had to work with.

1. **Naval superiority** – We maintained control of Korean coastal waters, enabling rapid repositioning.
2. **Air dominance** – Carrier-based **F4U Corsairs** and land-based **F-80s** gave us precision strikes against retreating enemy units.

3. **Superior Infantry & Coordination** – The **1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry** worked seamlessly with artillery and armor.
4. **Logistical Flexibility** – We landed reinforcements **faster than the enemy could respond**, keeping them off balance.

TERRAIN & MOBILITY EXPLOITATION

Gentlemen, terrain dictates the fight. What we learned from Inchon must be applied **north of Seoul** to maintain our momentum.

Urban Control (*Points to Seoul.*)

- North Korean forces depend on *fixed defenses in urban terrain*. We must surround strongholds before direct engagement.
- **Encirclement, not attrition, must be the strategy.** Use artillery and air strikes to weaken enemy positions before infantry advances.

Highways & Rivers (*Gestures to the Han River.*)

- The **Han River crossings** are essential—enemy units must retreat across them. We will **destroy key bridges** to stall their movement.
- Mechanized units must **control major roadways**, cutting enemy supply routes before they regroup.

Breakout & Encirclement (*Points north of Seoul.*)

- **North Korean forces south of Seoul are retreating.** They will attempt a fallback north to the 38th Parallel.
- We will **deploy mechanized and airborne units to cut off their escape.**
- **Armor should engage in open terrain** where our long-range firepower exceeds their capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General, this is how we finish the job. **Our window is limited—winter approaches, and Soviet reinforcements are not off the table.**

1. **Expand air superiority** – Secure additional captured airfields to support bombing runs **north of Pyongyang.**
2. **Naval envelopment** – Deploy forces toward **Wonsan and Hungnam** to force multiple enemy withdrawals.

3. **Armored spearheads** – Push **north rapidly** to exploit North Korean retreat while their forces remain fragmented.

CONCLUSION

Gentlemen, *Inchon was not just a battle—it was a lesson.* We shattered the enemy because we **used terrain to our advantage and moved faster than they could react.** If we apply this principle moving forward, we can end this war on our terms.

Any questions, General?